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Any project which employs people of different political views on
research into a subject as contentious as the conditions of industrial
labour is bound to generate dispute, even loud dispute. The industrial
relations project at the Institute has been no exception, and this paper
is therefore solely my own view of the hypothesis in the light of a
year's fieldwork in Senegal (one of the three countries, along with
Mexico and Sri Lanka, chosen for study).
1. The Hypothesis
The Late Development hypothesis' postulates that certain salient
features of the 'Japanese Employment System', i.e. the internal
organization and ideology of large Japanese firms, will tend to recur in
all countries which 'develop late', that is to say, go through a process of
capitalist industrialization in the twentieth century. Briefly the features
sought in large firms can be summed up as a 'welfare corporatism',
characterized by:
low turnover ('low' relative to Europe);
a 'lifetime career structure' assuring workers a steadily rising income
over their careers by means of a separation of wage from function;
the most original feature of the Japanese system was thought to be
its dispensing with the 'equal pay for equal work' principle in wage
setting;
as an integral part of such a structure, internal promotion, internal
training, and the competitive hiring, at defined 'entry ports', of
school leavers and university graduates;
a clear distinction between permanent workers, who benefit from
this structure, and temporary workers, who do not;
* Maureen Mackintosh is a Research Officer at the Institute of Development
Studies.
A brief summary is bound to have elements of caricature; for a stateent of the
hypothesis by its author see the article by R.P. Dore, World Development vol. 2,
no. 4/5 April/May 1974, pp. 1-7.
5
unions chiefly oriented towards bargaining at enterprise or plant
level;
a planned personnel structure, with a personnel manager to make
and/or implement policy;
substantial welfare benefits provided by the company, and a large
wage, or rather total benefits, gap between workers in large firms and
wage earners in all other productive sectors of the economy;
an 'enterprise consciousness' or positive identification with the
company deliberately fostered by management policy.
The explanations put forward for the expected recurrence of this set of
features were based on the diffusion of technology and of
organizational forms: the technological gap between the requirements
of advanced industry and those of previous forms of work, plus the size
of firms, and the fact that each will often have a monopoly of a
particular product, means that each firm is forced to do extensive
internal training; the aim of the planned career structures is then to
retain these trained workers.
The provision of welfare benefits has the same end in view. This
reorganization of pay and promotion structures is facilitated by the
institution of the personnel manager, and in general by a hierarchical,
bureaucratized and planned personnel structure imported from abroad.
Given this structure of managerial initiatives, and the differential ability
to pay of different firms, unions orientate themselves towards plant or
enterprise bargaining, to gain the maximum benefits from each firm,
thus moving away from rate-for-the-job principles across firms, and
reinforcing the enterprise-centred pattern.
Finally, there are policy implications which boil down to the statement
that if this pattern were found to be widespread, then government
policy should start realistically from this situation, rather than from the
rate-for-the-job, high turnover, flexible unitary labour market
assumptions of much labour market analysis in industrialized countries
2. The Evidence
To what extent did we find the hypothesized pattern of industrial
relations in Senegal? To the extent that we did, does the evidence also
support the explanations for this pattern?
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Certain features of industrial organization for which we are looking are
embedded in Senegalese labour law, notably a distinction between the
status and rights of temporary and of permanent workers, of whom the
latter have the right to legal redress against unfair dismissal, and the
principle set out in all Collective Agreements of priority of internal
promotion over hiring from outside the firm. Both of these, however,
are not products of the adaptation of law to Senegalese conditions, but
derive from French labour law, imported into French West Africa in the
Overseas Labour Code of 1952.
The question, however, is not law but practice. To begin with the
question of internal promotion, four different patterns of promotion
were visible in the ten firms studied in Senegal in 1973. Firstly, three
firms hired effectively only into the lowest grades2 ,thereafter
promoting workers as vacancies occurred through supervisor level.
These three were all what might be called 'low technology' firms,
employing production line techniques requiring on the whole simple
skills, with few jobs requiring more than a day or two to learn.
Secondly, firms having a more automated technology (such as the
groundnut oil firms and the oil refinery) now tend to hire as production
workers, above the labourer grades (machine minders and maintenance
workers), secondary school leavers with the first level technical
qualification, the Certificat d'Aptitude Professionelle (CAP); these
entrants can hope to be promoted, should places be available, up to the
lower supervisory grades, but with difficulty beyond that. The third
pattern is the promotion history of older workers (more than ten years
seniority) in these same firms. Many of these men had come into the
firms as labourers and had learnt production or maintenance work on
the job; they have, while continuing to do essentially the same work,
seen their grade gradually increase over the past twenty years, and
many in particular had their jobs sharply reclassified when the
Collective Agreements were signed in the late 195 Os. The fourth pattern
is that of, in particular rural, firms which still use a high proportion of
temporary or permanent labourers. These firms tend overall to be less
organized and planned than the others (and less concerned with the
letter of the law), but in general in these firms permanent workers tend
2 Jobs in firms in Senegal are ranked in the Collective Agreements by grade
(catgo rie) according, in principle at least, to the skill required for the job. With
each grade in any industry is associated a base wage.
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to be hired from outside already with some basic skill, with the
exception that supervisors of groups of labourers, who then do the
daily hiring of their workers, are frequently chosen by management
from among the labourers.
What are the explanations of these promotion patterns? The Late
Development hypothesis would suggest that the internal promotion
occurs where there is a need to establish career patterns to retain
trained people. This raises two related issues: turnover, and the extent
and methods of training.
Turnover of personnel in industry in Senegal is low by any standards,
chiefly because of the large imbalance between the number of people
seeking such jobs and the number available. It is very difficult to get a
job. However, turnover is higher among more highly skilled staff
(engineers and technicians) who are still in short supply, and in demand
because of pressure on firms to Africanize these posts, and also among
younger workers. Furthermore, more industrial experience does seem
to be of positive value in getting another industrial job. This is
illustrated by the number of people who succeed in switching between
the only two industrial firms left in the inland tow'i of Kaolack. It is
also supported by the managers' comments. While the shift described
above towards the hiring of blue collar workers from among secondary
school leavers with the CAP has occurred as the number of such
candidates has increased, managers of these firms expressed no
preference for hiring schqol leavers as such. On the contrary they said
that they would prefer to hire workers with the qualification plus a few
years' experience. Senegalese workers and engineers alike expressed the
opinion that any employee offered more money elsewhere would
naturally change his job, and while, as a Senegalese engineer who had
moved three times pointed out, a 'reputation for instability' would be a
bad thing to acquire in such a small business community3 there was
little trace of a moral as opposed to practical, value being placed upon
loyalty to a single employer.4
The total wage and salary earning population in the private sector in Dakar was
estimated in 1970 at 45,000. The group of large employers is small.
A contrast is intended with the Japanese view of such loyalty.
8
The possibility for someone to change jobs depends on the type of skill
possessed: the more general the skill and the shorter the supply of it,
the better the chances. Because of the small size of the industrial sector
in Senegal, skills which in an industrialized country would be
transferable become specific. For example, the most skilled production
job in the shoe firm is cutting the leather. Since there is no other shoe
firm to use this skill, the firm is in no danger of losing these workers,
who would be virtually unskilled elsewhere. The majority of
production, shop floor jobs in the firms studied either have this kind of
skill specificity, or they can be learnt very rapidly. The thesis that firms
must create promotion structures for these workers to protect their
investment in training seems hard to uphold, especially given labour
market conditions. This is much less true of skilled maintenance
workers and technicians. Workers who receive lengthy training from a
firm may be asked to agree to stay for a given minimum period of years
after training.
Even where there is no danger of losing the workers in question,
managers may have excellent reasons for instituting internal promotion.
One is technical linkages between jobs: if part of the training for one
job appears as a by-product of working on another, less-skilled job, then
promotion from one job to the other implies a reduction in training
costs. Such linkages were found in several of the firms studied. More
generally, internal promotion may be an economical method of
selecting candidates for a post: for jobs not requiring high levels of
technical competence, a manager is not seeking the best candidate in
the whole labour market but needs a cheap method of selecting a
suitable person. Internal promotion may offer him this, and also allow
him to serve other ends, of which the most frequently cited were the
maintenance of morale among older workers, the rewarding of merit,
ensuring that the more responsible positions were held by people well
known to management, and responding to shop floor pressure for such
promotion.
All of the foregoing has to be seen in the light of economic conditions
in Senegal. The economy is in a state of stagnation and even decline.
Real wages seem to have fallen over the last few years, and there is no
regular bargaining over the levels of wages, minimum wages for each
grade being only occasionally changed at government level. Workers see
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their main hope of a wage rise as promotion within a firm, so that one
of the main union activities at the plant level is to press for this kind of
increase for individual workers. Unless there are compelling reasons for
hiring from the outside, managers may well have more to gain than to
lose by giving in to this pressure.
This brings us to the questions of wages and welfare benefits. The
hypothesis led us to look for two features in particular: welfare benefits
provided by individual firms, and a separation of wage from function to
allow for important seniority increments in wages.
Almost all workers in these firms receive additions to their monthly
wage packets over and above the base wage for their grade. The only
such addition which is a legal obligation on firms is a one per cent
increase for each year of seniority up to fifteen years. Beyond this, the
relation of wage to seniority depends on the policy of the firm. For
example, in the shoe firm, wages are correlated with seniority because
of the internal promotion system, but within a grade, the percentage
addition to base wages is little affected by seniority, being much more
influenced by the type of payment system applied to the job (piece
rates or group bonus) and by the type of job done. On the other hand,
in the oil refinery where most workers receive some increase in wages
each year, wages within for example the seventh grade are more highly
correlated with seniority, as they are in firms which have a series of
'steps' between grades, where the more senior workers tend to be higher
up on these steps. However, the shift in hiring patterns described above,
and the process of Africanization in the last five years, has had a
perverse effect on the relation overall between wage and seniority
which was summed up by the manager of a peanut oil producing firm:
'The question is simple. The older they are, the less skilled they are, and
the less they earn'. This effect is clearly visible in the wage/seniority
graph for one of the groundnut oil firms, and it makes it difficult to
predict how this relation will look when the new workers have a few
years' seniority.
In no firm was there found a separation of wage from function on the
Japanese scale. The firm which came closest to such a separation was
the clothing firm, because in this firm the relation between grade and
job was less closely defined and less contested by the union than in
lo
other firms, so that management and supervisors had more power to
move workers between jobs as they saw fit. In this firm the wage had
moved towards being a 'person-related' (as opposed to 'job-related')
wage, a fact that fits into the very personalistic style of management of
this firm, where hiring was chiefly done through family connections
with established workers, and discipline was implemented by a
Disciplinary Council of union delegates and supervisors. However, some
of the other features for which we were looking were absent from this
firm: its personnel policy was not carefully planned, nor was it notably
bureaucratized; on the contrary, the daily organization tended to
depend on the personnel information carried in the heads of a few
supervisors; entry was not competitive but nepotistic, and the firm gave
few welfare benefits.
Welfare benefits for workers in addition to regular wages increased
noticeably in Senegal during the 1960s and early 1970s. The forms
these benefits take are firstly, bonuses: either end of the year, twice
yearly (in some firms these now amount to a thirteenth month), or
individual bonuses for specific events such as marriage. Secondly, and
much the most important quantitatively, there is access to interest-free
credit. A very high proportion of Senegalese workers are in debt to
their employers, be it for advances on wages in the middle of the
payment period, for loans for family events such as baptisms, for
hospital expenses, for Muslim festivals such as Tabaski (the loans for
which can exceed a month's wages), or for such major expenditures as
building a house. In addition to this debt structure, firms must by law
offer the services of a nurse, and free consultation with a doctor, plus
regular health checks; a few have added to this free vaccination and
anti-malarial medication during the wet season, and two have full scale
medical insurance for all personnel to which the firm contributes. As
for housing, most firms house their Senegalese managers and some, a
few technicians. No firm studied provides housing for workers, but a
couple are having discussions with unions about the possibility of
establishing a Cité Ouvrière. Other benefits found in a few firms include
subsidized canteens (still frequently expensive in relation to blue-collar
wages) and foodshops and either a premium for the cost of transport,
or free firm transport (the latter mainly for shift workers in rather
inaccessible firms).
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Two questions arise about these benefits. Firstly, why do unions push
hard for them? Why do they not push simply for higher wages? And
secondly, what are managers' motivations for granting them? To begin
with the second question, the firm with the most extensive medical
benefits offered a justification in terms of straightforward profitability:
by improving the system of preventative checks, and preventative
medication, absences had been sharply reduced, and in general
productivity benefited from better health care. Transport and the
discussions about housing were justified on the grounds that it was
becoming more and more costly and tiring for workers to get to work,
with resultant decreases in efficiency, and increases in lateness. And it
must also be true, though this explanation was not of course offered by
managers, that workers dependent on a firm not only for wages, but for
medical care or housing for the whole family, will be less likely, not so
much to leave, but to indulge in the kind of militancy which might be
an excuse for sacking. This is illustrated by the fact that welfare
benefits are not strongly related to seniority; workers whom firms are
genuinely in danger of losing, such as electrical technicians, tend to be
given higher benefits on hiring rather than the promise of higher
benefits later. Transport, medical insurance or availability of loans
generally apply to all permanent workers with some quite small
minimum seniority. A few of these benefits have clearly been won by
identifiable episodes of militancy of the workers in the firm in
question.
Why then do unions in Senegal push for this type of benefit, which is in
general decried by unions, for example, in Britain? Firstly, because it is
not politically possible for the union to bargain for overall increases at
the enterprise level in wage rates: base rates are set at government level,
and the union confederation exerts pressure from time to time on the
government for such changes. The best the union can do at plant level is
to seek for increases for individuals or groups in bonuses or categories.
Such increases that can be achieved in this way are uncertain, and at
present rapidly eroded by inflation. Medical insurance or housing on
the other hand is much more inflation-proof, they directly aid the
family as well as the individual worker, and they provide some
insurance against the future in a country with no State-provided social
security.
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Finally, what structure of trade unionism was found in Senegal? The
main tendency which the unions in Senegal carried over from their
experience in the colonial era (Senegal gained her independence in
1960) was an orientation towards pressure on the state to implement its
demands vis-a-vis private firms. This resulted directly from the pivotal
role played by the French colonial state in the conditions of labour:
one of the major events in pre-Independence labour history was the
series of strikes which led up to the passing of the Overseas Labour
Code regulating the conditions of labour in the colonies. Since
Independence this orientation towards political action has undergone a
mutation: in 1969 the older, combative union federation, the UNTS,
was broken up, and a new single confederation, the CNTS, formed. This
was dependent on the single governing political party, with several of its
leaders holding government posts. As a result of this, and of the pivotal
role the state still plays in wage setting, the union now has two
orientations. The leaders are in principle spokesmen for the union
members at government level, and in fact find themselves very much
caught between conflicting pressures when feeling among the working
class is strong enough, for example about inflation. Secondly, at plant
level, individual union delegates (firms have by law to permit the
election of delegates, and all but one of the firms studied had done so)
play a role, when they are active, which is a cross between an advocate
and a social worker. They spend a large part or their time aiding
individual workers in disputes with management, trying to get
individual jobs reclassified (usually on the grounds that the job has in
some way changed), or in trying to see that workers obtain the benefits
to which they have a right. They also try to seek improvements in the
kind of welfare benefits discussed above. Strikes are in principle illegal
(though they do sometimes occur), and there is no overall bargaining
over wage levels at the level of the plant. The unions are in effect very
weak, and their weakness is reflected in the lack of restrictions in
practice on managerial powers over promotion, hiring and the setting of
levels of bonuses.
3. Conclusions
How then has the Late Development hypothesis stood up to
confrontation with Senegal? The main casualty has I think been the
structure of explanation which runs from technology, to training, to
the need to keep trained people. This may have been a part of the
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explanation of the Japanese structure, since it is most likely to operate
in a rapidly expanding economy where trained people are in severely
short supply. Senegal, however, is not industrializing rapidly and
therefore retaining skilled workers is not a major preoccupation of
management.
A more general point is that the structure of the hypothesis, with its
emphasis on managerial initiative and on causality at the level of the
individual firm, leaves out of account the influence of wider social
groups and other social institutions in the explanation of the state of
industrial relations. The most evident omission is the role of the state.
This is particularly crucial in Senegal because of its colonial history and
of the centralized a.nd legalistic form taken by French colonialism (and
indeed by French political institutions in general). The importance of
law in determining the conditions of industrial labour, the orientation
of the trade union movement towards the changing and enforcing of
that law, the pivotal role played by the state in wage and price setting,
and in the mediation of conflicts, all this was taken over by the
Senegalese government from its colonial predecessors. In addition, the
post-Independence government has sought to break down the power of
the trade union movement, which in the past has disrupted Dakar and
threatened the government. The organization and orientation of the
Senegalese trades unions, and their current weakness cannot be
understood without this background.
Nor can management policy towards wages and welfare be understood
without an understanding of government policy on these issues. Basic
wages have been officially frozen by the government since the early
1960s on the public grounds that the industrial workers already form a
privileged group. They were raised after the strikes of 1968, and have
been raised again recently (1973) in response to outcries against severe
inflation. But this raises demands also for higher wages in the public
sector, and the government is also seeking other ways of calming the
outcry, including encouraging private firms to offer piecemeal bonuses,
to set up medical insurance schemes, and to provide cheaper food
through co-operative buying schemes in the factories. We have
examined above why unions have also sought these benefits.
The political economy of wage setting in semi-industrialized countries is
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very poorly understood at present, but one might say that the firms
studied for this project display two different strategies. One is that
pursued by the rural firms studied, and to some extent by the clothing
firm in Dakar: a high proportion of unskilled or fairly low skilled
workers' wages not far above basic wages, or even below minimum
wages in one firm, a lack of welfare provision, and a personalistic style
of hiring and managing of most of the personnel. At the other extreme
are firms with a low or very low proportion of less-skilled workers as a
result of mechanization, a rising level of welfare provision, a tendency
to provide for workers' families through these welfare benefits, as well
as for the workers themselves, a more centralized, bureaucratic and
rule-bound style, and a lot more philanthropic rhetoric. The firms
which are nearer to the latter than to the former extreme do not
necessarily have the most effective internal promotion patterns, nor the
closest overall correlation between wage and seniority. It is a mistake, I
think, to argue that the emergence of the latter pattern of wage and
welfare provision is a result chiefly of technological imperatives, just as
it is also a mistake, more often committed by economists, to see
mechanization only as the result of increases in wages and welfare
benefits (especially in a situation of world inflation). One needs to add,
as argued above, government imperatives and policy, and the nature of
the trade union movement, and one also needs an understanding of the
economic situation of the firms in question: the majority (not all) of
the firms studied did not rely to any marked extent on the Senegalese
market for the disposal of their goods; they are therefore not involved
in any cumulative process of industrialization, based on an internal
market, which will tend to raise real wages while also increasing
productivity, but are concerned to retain competitivity in export
markets based in part on low wages. The large part of capital in the
country is foreign, and it should not be assumed that its aims and
imperatives are of the same type as those of an indigenous
entrepreneurial class in Japanese industrialization.
This brings us to another point. The author of the Late Development
hypothesis assumed that Japanese culture had influenced, though not
determined, the organization of Japanese industry. This would lead one
to seek an answer to the question, to what extent the nature of
Senegalese society had influenced the French scheme of industrial
relations imported along with French capital. But such adaptations take
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a different form when the managers of the firms are not of the
indigenous culture in question. Only in the last four years or so has
there begun to be an important number of Senegalese managers of the
foreign industrial firms in Senegal, and it will be some years yet before
it is seen what adaptations they will eventually bring to the
management, though one might hypothesize a more personalistic style,
and more 'integrationist' enterprise-oriented rhetoric vis-à-vis the rest of
the employees (in part because of the effect of a split which has
developed in some firms between Senegalese managers and the
technicians who feel underprivileged vis-à-vis the managerial groups).
But all this will depend on the economic and political situation in
Senegal in the next few years.
In brief then, this project has led us to collect a great deal of detailed
information about the internal organization of large firms in three semi-
or little-industrialized countries. The information has certainly
demonstrated the need for better understanding of the nature of labour
markets and of the social structure of industry in these countries, and
has demonstrated the inadequacy of any 'free market, rate-for-the-job'
model of the labour markets (an inadequacy which is not, in many
people's opinion, limited to the analysis of the labour markets of less
industrialized countries). But neither the Japanese model, nor the type
of explanation proposed for it has turned out to be adequate to
describe or explain Senegalese reality. The research has, as was perhaps
inevitable, raised to my mind more questions than it has answered.
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